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27 December 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Strategic Research
Presidential Briefing Coordinator

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Response to SecDef C³I Question

REFERENCE: Memo to DCI from D/OSR, dated 5 December 1978,
same subject

25X1 1. I read Sid's memo of the 5th on responding to SecDef's request for a Community study of Soviet C³I. I don't want to start something that will throw your work program off; at the same time, after reading the ten enclosures to your paper, I don't think, in themselves, they would come close to satisfying SecDef's desires. Since he is one of our principal consumers, I'd like to provide him whatever service we can. []

25X1 2. My suggestion is that we beef up the proposed briefing [] and try that on the SecDef to see where he thinks we should go next and what portion of that the proposed DOD net assessment study will undertake, or what portion has already been done by some of the field commanders, particularly SAC. I know that General Ellis puts a great deal of attention on Soviet command and control. []

25X1 3. I think the SecDef is much more interested in their doctrine than in just their multiple avenues for transmitting data. Hence, I think we ought to redo the proposed briefing by expanding and emphasizing the command structure. First, how do the national authorities interface with the military? At what levels and with what authority? It seems to me we could compare this with the command line from the President to the SecDef and then directly to the unified commanders, by-passing the JCS. []

25X1 4. I was intrigued by Tab 3 to your paper on the theater commands in the Warsaw Pact. In short, I think we could develop another set of comparisons here showing the top-heavy permanent command structure of NATO and the apparently very lean command structure of the Warsaw Pact

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25X1 with some implication that it would be fleshed out in wartime. It is my recollection that even the fronts don't have a peacetime command structure, let alone all the intermediate theater commanders that we have in NATO. ☐

5. I think the briefing ought to look at Soviet doctrine. What do we know from their exercises as to what degree of authority is exercised at different levels? How do we think that compares with us? (We don't really know--I spent my year and a half as CINCSOUTH trying to delineate what I would do in wartime as opposed to my component commanders and yet I was almost certain that General Haig's staff would do all of it for both of us when the time came!) ☐

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6. Next we could look at the physical means of communication that cover each level of command, i.e., how many ways are there for the national command authority to get down to whatever level it goes to, etc.? Included in this would be indications of increasing trends like the development of the IL-22. In that connection I would like to

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7. In short, let's start with the restructuring of ☐ briefing with more emphasis on doctrine and command structure, pointing out where we are vague because we lack information. I will then take this to SecDef to get the comparisons with the United States and to find out where his interests truly lie. If, as we go along at each section of the briefing, we indicate what our own sense of confidence is, we can then also at the end determine where and how much effort will be needed to fulfill the SecDef's desires when he indicates them. ☐

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Star

STANSFIELD TURNER

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